COMPARING MODERNIZATION IN IRAN AND TURKEY

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Abstract
The present paper examines and compares the questions whether there are any differences between Iran and Turkey in modernization and if this is the case whether this is gender equality, family values, or secularity that causes such differences. Data from the Iranian and the Turkish part of the World Values Survey (WVS) forth wave are used for the empirical analysis. Conceptual and methodological effects influence the structural equation model.

Key Words: Modernity, Gender Equality, Secularity, Family Values, Logistic Regression, Structural Equation Modeling.

JEL Classification: Z

1. INTRODUCTION

It is generally agreed that the project of modernity as a social, cultural, and economic sphere has been a Western undertaking (Wittrock, 2000). Is it possible to have different paths to modernity or is there a standardized, scientific version of modernity that developed its unique origins in the West? Counterbalancing state power by a continuous change, conformation and assimilation to a range of historical conditions is well known for the traditional civil societies in Muslim countries (Kamali, 2001). Modernization did not only account for the traditional balancing of power between state and civil society in Muslim countries, but also produced the modern civil societies throughout Muslim countries (Kamali, 2001). A state-organized reform programs can be observed both in Iran and Turkey during the nineteenth century: administrative and military reforms called nezam-e jaded – New Order - in Persian and nizam-i cedid –New Order - in Turkish.
We will limit ourselves to the comparison of Iran and Turkey exploring the extent to which the two differ in terms of their modernization. Both countries displayed moderately low average levels of modernization and subsequently lie close to each other on the cultural-map reported by Inglehart-Welzel (2002). According to Inglehart’s cultural map¹ in which he plots out how countries relate to each other on a double axis of values (ranging from ‘traditional’ to ‘secular-rational’ on the vertical scale and from ‘survival’ to ‘self-expression’ on the horizontal one) both Iran and Turkey seem to succeed in creating the more modern and powerful Muslim countries in the Middle East compared with other Muslim societies. Accordingly, there are no other Muslim societies apart from Iran and Turkey that could be described as having more secular-rational values and likewise on the right side of the map which could be described as having more subjective well-being. For example, societies with traditional values, near the ‘traditional’ side of the traditional/secular-rational axis, have strong emphasize on religion. Societies that place a strong emphasis on the important of parental-child ties along with traditional family values, submission to authority, and objection of divorce and abortion. They also tend to take a special pride in their nation. But countries more to the ‘secular-rational’ side of this axis are more likely to entail opposite preferences to the traditional values. Societies that people place a strong emphasis on relatively tolerant attitudes towards divorce and abortion. Religion is not important in the daily life, family values are less traditional, and people are more likely to hold an attitude on oppose authority.

We will compare the conditions and the development of the modernization ideology in Iran and Turkey which are both considered to be rather homogeneous Non- Arab Muslim societies and generated approximately the same paths of modernity.

1.1 MODERNIZATION

Modernization theory originated in the Age of Enlightenment which was enthralled with the idea of progress and development, as the new faith of modern age; based on that people themselves boundless could develop and change their society (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). Marquis de Condorcet, a French philosopher, advanced the idea of the continuous progress in which will enable change in cultural values in society.²

¹ This cultural map is provided by Inglehart (1997: 334-37) based on the 1990-1991 World Value Surveys.
² http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modernization_theory
The Modernization theory falls into two dominant schools of thought (Inglehart, 1997): On one hand, a Marxist version of modernity claims that economics, politics and culture are closely linked as the economic progress determines the political and cultural aspects of society. On the other hand a Weberian version has concentrate on the powerful and an enduring impact of cultural values upon society (Inglehart, 1997).

We think, modernization might have an impact on gender equality, secular attitudes, and family values. However, in comparing societies in modernization, one would find different effects. Nonetheless, the more effect of modernization on particular factor, the more modernized societies on that factor.

1.2 VISUALIZATION OF MEASUREMENT MODEL

Figure 2 shows a specificati on of four-factor model for different attitudes indicators of gender equality,, secularity, family values and democratic attitudes. A structural equation modeling approach is chosen in order to run a joint analysis of the presumed underlying factors and their relationship with each other.

The hypothesized model, can be interpreted as representing a priori that modernization is a three-factor structure composed of Gender equality: F1; \( \xi_1 \); Secular attitudes: F2; \( \xi_2 \); and Family values: F3; \( \xi_3 \). The observed variables, indicated by the 12 rectangles, load onto the factors in the following pattern:

G1 - G4 load onto Factor 1(gender equality); S5 to S6 load onto Factor 2 (Secular attitudes); and F7 loads onto F3 (family values). Summarizing this model, we can see that the the modernization factors, consistent with the theory, are correlated but, error/uniquenesses associated with each measure are uncorrelated. Finally, the single-headed arrow pointing to each rectangle (\( \delta_1 - \delta_7 \) ) represents observed measurement error associated with the item variables. However, the error term delta for the single indicator of family values ( \( \delta_7 \) ) is been deleted because the error variance is not identified with only one indicator.

The present study test whether this model reflects the influence on the modernization enhancing effect of gender equality, secular attitudes, and/or family values.

2 METHOD & DATA

2.1 LEVEL OF MEASUREMENT

There is an ongoing debate about the appropriate level of measurement of modernization research. Survey data, social networks, micro- and macro-levels of sociological analysis have been used in studies of modernization. Individual-level
variables (age, gender, education, income) and macro-level variables (democracy level, quality and social capital levels of the nations) are used to analyze the level of modernization. Social network analysis provides a proper framework to study modernization in the context of individuals that interact (or do not interact) in a group. The opinions on family values included in the present study are not sufficiently enough to measure modernized family values, but rather an indicator for inclination towards family values in modernized societies. For the present study, the concept of individual level of modernization is adopted in order to explore the effects described in Section 1.2.

2.2 DATA

Data from the 1999-2001 World Values Survey (WVS), the fourth wave of the WVS project, are used to carry out the analyses. The two sets of data which are presented from 01-01-2000 to 28-02-2000 (Iran) and from 01-12-2001 to 01-01-2002 (Turkey) are utilized and have respectively 2600 and 3401 cases.

Our analysis of the WVS will be mostly focused on factor analysis to select items that cluster together and hence measure the same underlying concept, (measurement part of LISREL). Those factors obtained from factor analysis will be considered as factors by applying Structural Equation Modelling to measure, as there are gender equality, family values and secularity. Based on the model a composition of all those factors is assumed as modernization and is considered as theory behind them. The quality of the data is not deemed sufficient for the purpose of the present study. The absence of some previous selected items in both datasets is another limitation. The data are likely to share some method variance, because they stem from the same survey. The individual cases were not significant. Cases with missing links on any of the variables of interest were excluded from the analyses. Iran’s dataset comparing to Turkey’s dataset has huge missing cases in many items so that they were not useful. Although there are some

3 The major shortcoming of this approach is the lack of (theoretical and practical) means to obtain general population samples. It is also unclear how this type of data could be aggregated to the national level.

4 The study has carried out four waves of surveys to samples of respondents that are nationally representative: in 1981-1982, 1990-1991, 1995-1998, and 1999-2003. A fifth wave of data collection began in 2005 but was not complete by the time this present work had started. Thus the fourth wave will be used since this wave is complete and includes Iran and Turkey simultaneously. A total of 79 countries have been surveyed in at least one wave of the WVS. These countries include almost 85 percent of the world’s population. Their per capita annual gross national products range from US$300 to US$30,000 and their political regimes range from well-established and stable democracies to authoritarian governments.
items which were only asked in one of the countries, they are useless for the purpose of making a comparison between the two countries.

2.3 Testing the Regression Models

Individuals are compared with respect to gender equality, attitudes to secularity and family values. Evaluation was done on a series of multiple regression models with those three attitudes variables as dependent variables and age, gender and education demographic variables as independent variables in Iran and Turkey. Their findings demonstrate that there is indeed a difference between the Iranian and Turkish models with regard to used variables in the current study. In other words the observed differences between Iran and Turkey are relevant to educated differences and gender differences rather than age differences. In table 1 we are comparing Iran with Turkey using unstandardized beta for age, gender and education with respect to standard deviation in all three scales.

The two sets of attitudes identified by factor analysis are the dependent variables in the analysis to follow. D059, d060, d077 and c001 have been combined to form an additive index measuring the first of these scales, equality in gender. A006 and f063 have been combined to form an additive index measuring the second of these scales, attitudes to secularity. F054 also as a one only ordinal variable described the family values.

**Table 1: Multiple Regressions. Comparing Iran & Turkey- Using Unstandardized**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IndependentVar.</th>
<th>Gender-Equality</th>
<th>Secularity</th>
<th>Family-Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Iran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>1.673</td>
<td>1.380</td>
<td>-.171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.123)</td>
<td>(.086)</td>
<td>(.064)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.027</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>-.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.005)</td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td>(.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.230</td>
<td>.495</td>
<td>.069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.030)</td>
<td>(.019)</td>
<td>(.015)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Notes: The table shows un-standardized coefficients (betas), all standard errors in parentheses.*

Based on Table 1 both in Turkey and Iran, education is the only variable that can effectively influence the family value. Findings from present research are somewhat mixed regarding the relationship between demographic characteristics
and attitudes towards gender equality. However, there is at least some evidence that support for gender equality is positively related to education in Turkey while to gender in Iran. Similarly, both Iranians and Turkish gender (female) are negatively related to secular attitudes. Turkey in both support for gender equality and family values has higher degree, however, attitudes toward secularity is inversely, Iran has higher one, although is negative.

Findings about age are interesting because the direction of the relationship is different in the two countries for gender equality and secularity. However, age is related to both dependent variables to a statistically non-significant indicator in Iran and Turkey. In the former country both gender equality and secularity have a higher value in lower age and in the latter country they are associated with higher age. It is quite intriguing that people in Turkey settled to modernization earlier than in Iran and that explains why elder people support modernization. However age is not related to family values attitudes in both countries.

### 2.4 LISREL MODELS FOR IRAN & TURKEY

The completely standardized solution contains a rather small correlation between gender equality and secular attitudes factors in the Iran data set (=0.213) comparing the one in Turkey (0.526). This difference can be caused by secular education in Turkey that is forbidden to teach in Iran.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>parameter</th>
<th>Iran</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ϕ1,1</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ϕ1,2</td>
<td>0.213(4.70)</td>
<td>0.526(14.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ϕ2,2</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ϕ2,3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.532(9.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ϕ3,3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ϕ3,1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.430(5.87)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: t values appear in parentheses.

Comparing the loading onto gender equality in both countries we can see from Table2 that the loading for the first three indicators in the Iran sample is larger than for Turkey dataset. Moreover, in the Turkish sample the indicator of family values factor has also loaded onto gender equality. In the Iranian sample however,
there is no longer a family values factor because its only indicator has loaded onto both gender equality and secular attitudes which can be interpreted that family values in Iran are part of gender equality and secular attitudes.

**Figure 1**: Path diagram -SEM model -  

**Figure 2**: Path diagram -SEM model -

\[ \chi^2 = 19.10, \text{ df } = 11, p = 0.0593, \text{ RMSEA} = 0.019 \]

\[ \chi^2 = 14.15, \text{ df } = 8, p = 0.0779, \text{ RMSEA} = 0.015 \]

Figure 1 and 2 show that the correlation of secular attitudes and gender equality appears to depend on the differences on both measurement model of data and also these two societies. There is a correlation higher than 0.5 in the Turkish model, whereas the Iranian data yields a correlation smaller than 0.22 altogether. The relationship between the two concepts seems to be vulnerable to operational and societal diversity.

Comparing observed variables load onto secular attitudes factor in both Iran and Turkey models. There are three indicators in each model in which “Religion important in life”, a006, and “How important is God in your life”, f063, are common in both models but they have one different extra indicator which in Iran is “One of main goals in life has been to make my parents proud”, d054, but in Turkey is “Jobs scarce: Men should have more right to a job than women”, c001,. However, the latter loading is not sufficiently high.
Since high scores on the secular attitudes variable (ξ₂) are indicative of poor religious belief, comparing secular attitudes in both samples shows that given equal to importance of religion in life, Turkish people had fairly high secular thinking in importance of God in their life than Iranian do.

In fact, the modest coefficients for importance of God in Iranians life strongly indicates the differences between two samples with regard to low coefficients in both items in Iran comparing to very high coefficients for those in Turkey.

The results reviewed here demonstrate conclusively that the differences between Iran and Turkey can be caused by differences in attitudes to secularity. Turkey followed a change that was rooted in an ideological change, a secular constitutional, whereas in Iran the change was vice versa by emerging an Islamic regime in 1979 in which described clearly as an obstacle for progressing in modern attitudes.

Family values factor regarding to our data from Iran is not a separated factor. D054, “One of main goals in life has been to make my parents proud”, in the Iranian sample is not related only to gender equality but to secular attitudes as well. In the Turkish dataset the respondents to whether “Wife must obey” is strongly related to family values factor with regard to its loading (=0.37).

3. CONCLUSION

This essay draws on sample surveys of public opinion in two predominantly Muslim countries of Middle East, Turkey and Iran. These Non-Arab Muslim countries have characteristic histories that make them different from other Muslim countries.

Individuals are compared with respect to gender equality, attitudes to secularity and family values using Multiple Regression analysis model in both datasets. Findings from two Iran and Turkey are somewhat mixed regarding the relationship between demographic characteristics and attitudes towards all three different attitudes. However, there is at least some evidence that support for gender equality is positively related to education in Turkey while to gender in Iran. Results about age are interesting because the direction of the relationship is different in the two countries for gender equality and secularity. However age is not related to family values attitudes in both countries.

In Turkey, the decrease of the traditional order, the rise of capitalist structure and the appearance of the modern bureaucratic administrative – all identified the development of a fairly modernism. In Iran, on the other hand, lacking of modern
culture change comparable in extent and breath to that of Turkey shows the relative defect of its change toward modernist. Moreover, comparing states officials between two countries, the modern Turkish state officials has clearly a significant effort in promoting modernism in their social life than Islamic Iranian state officials so that we can conclude that the Islamic state in Iran undermined the support of democracy, decline the attitudes to secularity and gender equality. Hence, in Turkey dataset we have a complex model that gender equality and family values are separated but in dataset for Iran family values explained by other cultural attitudes. However, in Turkey, the item "Men should have more right to a job than women" does not seem to be strong since it loads onto family values.

One of the lessons of this project is that research on comparing attitudes is still severely hampered by the lack of suitable data.

REFERENCES


